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The agreement reached by the British cabinet at Chequers is decisive for 
Brexit. The subsequent White Paper confirms the UK’s objective of reaching 
a comprehensive, dynamic association agreement with the EU. There is 
still uncertainty, however, with respect to British policy on the movement 
of people and the regulation of customs and financial services. The 
institutions for joint governance of the association agreement are assured 
with the exception of the future judicial authority. Doubts remain over the 
capacity of the British state to manage the Brexit process, and over the 
ability of the UK parliament to scrutinise it. 
Drafting the Political Declaration that must accompany the Withdrawal 
Agreement is the next critical step. The Salzburg summit on 20 September 
should confirm that there will be no extension of the Article 50 talks 
but that the transition period will be prolonged. In Britain, mainstream 
politicians of all parties should ready themselves to accept the Barnier 
package deal. A second referendum would risk the UK crashing out of the 
EU without a deal. 
The meeting of the British cabinet at Chequers on 
Friday 6 July gave a decisive steer towards the UK’s 
final post-Brexit landing zone, beyond transition.1 
Three crucial decisions were taken. Most importantly, 
the government accepted that a simple free trade 
agreement with the EU would be insufficient: 
frictionless borders for manufactured goods and 
industrial supply chains demand a deal that is better 
than Canada’s. Accordingly, the cabinet agreed to seek 
a comprehensive and dynamic association agreement 
with the EU based on a process of regulatory alignment 
and joint governance. The breakthrough eases a 
solution to the Irish border problem and allows the  
EU 27 to prepare for life without the Brits. 
Second, Chequers agreed to restore the collective 
ministerial responsibility of the cabinet which had 
been suspended since the referendum campaign. 
This decision led after a couple of days, as was surely 
intended, to the long-overdue resignation of the two 
worst ministers in the government, Foreign Secretary 
Boris Johnson and Brexit Secretary David Davis. Their 
fall was followed by the departure of a fanatic Brexiteer, 
Steve Baker, from a junior post in Davis’s department. 
Lastly, Chequers confirmed the exit date of 29 March 
2019. This issue was vital for Brexit hardliner Liam Fox, 
the trade minister, who continues to emphasise the 
importance of sticking to that date.2
Even though Theresa May finds it painfully difficult 
to articulate the case for the Chequers deal, she got 
what she needed. The majority of her MPs now seem 
to accept that a deal based on Chequers is better 
than no deal at all. On 16 July, the prime minister 
even struck a deal in the Commons with the militant 
Brexiteers, including four Labour rebels, who are led 
by the unusual Jacob Rees-Mogg. But by accepting 
their supposed ‘wrecking amendments’ to a trade and 
customs bill she implicated even these MPs in the 
continuing negotiations. 
Even though Theresa May finds it painfully 
difficult to articulate the case for the 
Chequers deal, she got what she needed. 
The majority of her MPs now seem to 
accept that a deal based on Chequers is 
better than no deal at all.
At the same time, fourteen pro-European Tory rebels 
lost their battle to force the UK to stay in the EU 
customs union. But they may have not lost the war. 
Chequers advanced a novel proposal for a Facilitated 
Customs Arrangement, a concept so complicated that 
it is bound to take many months to negotiate as well 
as many more months to implement whatever is finally 
agreed. In practice, and as the initial reactions of 
Michel Barnier suggest, it looks as though the UK will 
have to remain in the customs union, entirely in line 
with the EU customs code, for several years to come. 
Customs arrangements between the UK and the EU will 
not have changed materially before the date of the next 
British general election in May 2022. 
It looks as though the UK will have to 
remain in the customs union, entirely in 
line with the EU customs code, for several 
years to come.
THE WHITE PAPER
The White Paper following on from Chequers has been 
much criticised, especially by folk who have not read it.3 
True, like everything else this government publishes, 
it is a difficult read, often failing to disguise the gaps 
between paragraphs submitted by ministers at opposite 
ends of the Brexit spectrum. Words that lean forwards 
to soft Brexit are punctuated by others that lean back 
to reiterate earlier red lines. No wonder first reactions 
from Brussels and other capitals were guarded as the 
diplomats and epistemologists tried to figure it all out. 
But the main thrust of the White Paper is clear enough. 
Proposing an association agreement between the UK 
and the EU, it notes that there is plenty of precedent 
for the EU to do a bespoke deal with Britain, in the 
mutual interest of both parties. The UK seeks a new 
balance of rights and obligations based on two pillars of 
economy and security, leading to a dynamic relationship 
“responding and adapting to changing circumstances 
and challenges”. 
REGULATION
Chequers buried the hopes of some ‘Leave’ ministers 
that the UK can break free entirely from the EU’s 
regulatory orbit. The cabinet foresees two types of 
agreement with the EU on regulatory alignment. The 
first is effective harmonisation of UK and EU law under 
a common rulebook. The second consists of reaching 
mutual understanding on equivalent regulation, where 
rules are approximate but not identical. 
The UK will accept the EU’s rulebook on free trade 
in manufactured goods and farm products in order 
to eliminate tariffs, quotas and rules of origin 
requirements. It envisages one set of tests only to 
ensure compliance with EU norms in heavily regulated 
sectors, such as medicines and chemicals, where the 
UK expects continued direct engagement with the 
EU’s relevant agencies. It will conform to EU state aids 
and competition policy. It undertakes to adhere to 
current EU standards on social, climate, consumer and 
environmental policies. The government agrees  
to the inclusion of a non-regression clause in the 
association agreement. 
3
4GOVERNANCE
The White Paper embraces the concept of joint 
governance of the association agreement. Joint 
institutions will “underpin” (not oversee) the new 
arrangements under the political direction of a 
‘Governing Body’ – in EU parlance, the Association 
Council. Beneath that, a Joint Committee, following 
on from the Joint Committee already agreed for the 
transition period, will do the technical work. It will 
“manage and monitor the implementation of the future 
relationship” and try to resolve disputes. According 
to the British, and contrary to normal EU practice, 
the Joint Committee and not the Commission would 
judge the degree and quality of regulatory equivalence 
in any given field. Were the Joint Committee not to 
agree on equivalence, the dispute could be sent by 
either party to an independent arbitration tribunal 
for a binding ruling (and not, as normal under the EU 
regime, to the European Court of Justice). The tribunal 
would comprise judges from the UK, the EU and a third 
country. The merits of whether independent arbitration 
is a viable option “should be assessed on a case by case 
basis across different forms of cooperation”. 
The association agreement would oblige the British 
and EU courts to track each other’s performance. 
Where the common rulebook applies, either the Joint 
Committee or the tripartite tribunal could refer the 
matter to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for a 
binding ruling. The UK courts would be obliged to pay 
due regard to ECJ case law (although they would not 
be able by themselves to make preliminary references 
to Luxembourg on points of law). Where the UK 
participates in EU bodies or agencies, it would respect 
the remit of the ECJ. If the Joint Committee makes a 
ruling with the status of international law, it will be 
up to the UK government and parliament to legislate 
accordingly. The EU could impose penalties if any of 
the rulings were breached, including the suspension of 
part or all of the terms of the association agreement in 
a proportionate, temporary and localised manner. 
JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT
The UK is insisting that it must not be bound directly 
by the jurisdiction of the ECJ, although it has conceded 
that in limited and specific circumstances it may be 
bound indirectly. Inevitably, the Commission feels 
queasy at Britain’s qualified-only acceptance of the 
jurisdiction of the ECJ. The EU will not accept an 
independent arbiter that would allow the UK greater 
freedom as a third country to undercut the single 
market than it had as a member state. The Commission 
insists on remaining the arbiter of regulatory 
equivalence to preserve the integrity of the internal 
market. This is what Mr Barnier means when he talks 
about the level playing field and the autonomy of 
EU decision making. While the tripartite tribunal is 
appropriate for traditional trade disputes between 
international trading parties, it is unacceptable to the 
EU as the judicial authority for the internal market. For 
the Union, that must be the Court of Justice. 
Britain envisages the same third country membership 
of the aviation authority (EASA) as Switzerland.  
Thanks to ‘cooperative accords’, the British also  
hope to continue participation in EU policymaking,  
on a shared cost basis, in science, culture and 
development policies. 
Ambiguity is particularly troublesome in 
areas, notably financial services, where 
EU regulation is strict but the British want 
flexibility. Here the UK is sending very 
mixed messages.
Although the common rulebook will apply mainly 
to areas of the current acquis, it is unclear from the 
White Paper where the UK expects the demarcation 
line precisely to be drawn between harmonisation 
and approximation. That ambiguity is particularly 
troublesome in areas, notably financial services, 
where EU regulation is strict but the British  
want flexibility. Here the UK is sending very  
mixed messages. On the one hand, the UK wants 
liberation from the EU regime, bravely accepting  
the loss of passporting for the City of London  
and restricted access to the rich eurozone market  
in return for global adventure. That is the view  
of Jon Cunliffe, Deputy Governor of the  
Bank of England. 
On the other hand, Philip Hammond, Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, looks to establish a large degree of 
equivalence in financial services by way of reciprocal 
supervisory cooperation and regulatory dialogue. 
The White Paper does not tell us how much of EU 
banking union legislation the Treasury intends to 
parrot, although it indicates the need for British 
engagement with the European Securities and 
Markets Authority. 
The EU, for its part, is concerned that the UK is 
adopting an excessively pragmatic approach to the 
highly regulated sector of financial services based 
on the ambiguous concept of voluntary regulatory 
equivalence. The EU is also worried by the British 
proposal for the Facilitated Customs Arrangement – 
“at the cutting edge of global customs policy”  
which would leave the UK part in and part out of 
the EU’s customs territory and common commercial 
policy. Michel Barnier spelt it out to the press on  
26 July with respect to the Facilitated Customs  
Arrangement: “The EU cannot – and will not – 
delegate the application of its customs policy  
and rules, VAT and excise duty collection to a 
non-member who would not be subject to the EU’s 
governance structures.”4
How to manage ‘autonomous’ regulatory alignment 
with a third country throws up some basic problems  
of EU governance. 
5The negotiators of the association agreement will have 
to be particularly inventive in order to overcome the 
conflict over judicial oversight. There is likely to be a 
significant volume of post-Brexit litigation, at least 
initially, requiring a strong judicial system. I have argued 
previously that a totally new, joint EU-UK court with a 
weighted majority for the ECJ would do the trick.5 
A totally new, joint EU-UK court with a weighted 
majority for the ECJ would do the trick.
Meanwhile, the UK will have to beef up its own 
regulatory apparatus if it is to be trusted by the 
EU Commission and Court of Auditors. The White 
Paper pleads that the UK is trustworthy, but the 
EU’s experience is at variance. The record of Her 
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs in catching smugglers 
and levying dues correctly is known to be less than 
satisfactory. The UK Border Force is badly under-
staffed. Money laundering in the City of London 
continues. Britain has taken a selective approach to 
implementing EU law in justice and home affairs, 
failing to act reciprocally. A reality check is needed 
on the British plea of “look at our record” on human 
rights: the recent decision of Sajid Javid, Home 
Secretary, to consider extraditing two Jihadists to the 
USA without a commitment on capital punishment has 
not enhanced the UK’s negotiating position on Brexit. 
There is a strong argument for the creation 
of a new British surveillance authority 
to monitor the progress of regulatory 
alignment between the UK and the EU.
These apparent weaknesses in Britain’s domestic 
regulation encourage the EU to be even more insistent on 
ensuring strong oversight of the association agreement. 
Chequers and the White Paper are insufficient. Having 
once accepted the regulatory paradigm of an association 
agreement, the British will now have to move further 
towards the logic of the EU’s position. There is a strong 
argument for the creation of a new British surveillance 
authority to monitor the progress of regulatory alignment 
between the UK and the EU. The body would be 
independent of government but answerable to the Joint 
Committee and to the British parliament. 
SERVICES
The Chequers deal is limited on services, and the White 
Paper does little to clarify precisely what the UK wants. 
On professional services the UK proposes greater 
reliance on mutual recognition of qualifications, 
with something extra (unspecified) for lawyers and 
accountants to ensure continuity. This is consistent 
with Britain’s stance as a member state: that it is also 
a liberal policy explains why it has met in the past 
with resistance, especially from Germany. 
The association agreement will have to deal with both 
goods and services. Recent free trade agreements 
recognise that the old distinction between the two 
is dead. Motor cars, for example, are sold in our 
digital era with in-built information technology plus 
a financing scheme. On digital services, where the 
government wants divergence from EU law, the White 
Paper is aspirational only. 
MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE
Chequers and the White Paper offer little on the 
movement of people. There is the promise of no 
change in practice to the treatment of students and 
tourists. For workers, the government proposes to 
design a ‘mobility framework’ which will supply 
employers with the labour they need on a temporary 
basis. The UK hopes to manage the flow of European 
workers through new legislation on social welfare, the 
right of establishment and cross-border services. The 
government should know that the more reservations 
it puts on the freedom of movement of EU workers 
and their dependents, the more the EU’s 27 states will 
qualify their hospitality to Britons. 
More details of the government’s approach to 
asylum and immigration are expected in the autumn. 
Mr Javid is known to want to clamp down on the 
permanent immigration of EU citizens to the UK. 
But he knows from his initial discussions in the 
European Parliament that MEPs will not accept a deal 
that prejudices the rights of EU citizens either in the 
transition period or beyond. 
SECURITY
The UK wants a robust security partnership, including 
continued British engagement with Europol and 
Eurojust, guaranteeing the protection of personal 
and security data. Further chapters of the association 
agreement will cover intellectual property rights and 
civil and commercial law that may go beyond the EU’s 
current commitments with other third countries. How 
to continue British participation in the EU’s unitary 
patent scheme will also be explored. 
The White Paper commits the UK to continued 
adherence to the European Convention on Human 
Rights. It also implies continuing respect for the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which had 
been controversially ruled out by the recent EU 
(Withdrawal) Act. 
The government promises to respect EU legislation 
on data protection (GDPR) and law enforcement. 
It asserts the importance to the EU of continued 
6of understanding accompanying the Withdrawal 
Agreement. In case of litigation, the UK Supreme Court 
and the ECJ will be bound to take note of its content. 
British commentators are getting ready to dismiss the 
document as of little consequence. That is a mistake. The 
solemn Political Declaration of the European Council and 
the UK prime minister will have the status of EU soft law. 
It will be binding politically on both parties. If in due time 
Mr Corbyn or other unexpected events lead the UK and 
the EU in a direction different to that of the association 
agreement, the European Council would have to change 
course in a similarly solemn manner. 
As far as the European Council is concerned, the 
Political Declaration may serve as the first draft of the 
mandate that will charge the Commission to negotiate 
the association agreement.7 While the document 
will point clearly to the objective of the association 
agreement, the EU needs to leave itself sufficient 
flexibility for the negotiation itself, not pre-empting 
or precluding too much and leaving scope for some 
expression of national interests in what will be a treaty 
requiring ratification by all 27 states. 
What both sides must avoid is the problem thrown up 
by the loosely drafted Joint Report of December 2017 in 
which the UK and the EU added unilateral paragraphs 
– and then quarrelled later about what they really 
meant. This time the 27 + 1 political chiefs will sign off 
on the heads of agreement text at the summit, but in 
subterranean Brussels (otherwise known as Coreper II) 
the ambassadors, lawyers and officials will be working 
hard to ensure that the meaning of every word of the 
Political Declaration is commonly understood. 
There is still a question mark over how long and 
detailed the Political Declaration needs to be. 
Chancellor Merkel favours certainty, and she is  
difficult to gainsay. Somewhat boosted after Chequers, 
Theresa May is also pushing for a fairly granular 
document that will tie everyone down. But before 
the decisive meeting of the European Council in 
Brussels on 18-19 October, the prime minister has to 
face the ordeal of the Conservative Party Conference 
at Birmingham in the week of 30 September. Do not 
expect to see a public draft of the document before 
then. The otherwise commendable transparency of the 
Brexit process in Brussels is temporarily suspended. 
THE SALZBURG SUMMIT
Before Birmingham, on 20 September the whole 
European Council, including Mrs May, will meet in 
Salzburg. This is one of a series of informal summits 
introduced by President Tusk to advance his ‘Leader’s 
Agenda’. Besides making some elliptical statements 
regretting Brexit, Mr Tusk has seldom intervened 
directly in the Article 50 process, preferring to leave 
the heavy lifting to the Commission. As a result, he 
and the 27 leaders are relatively poorly prepared to 
discuss the details of their post-Brexit relationship 
with Britain.
UK participation in the EU’s mechanisms for 
internal security, such as SIS II for police and border 
surveillance, ECRIS and Prüm. It promises close UK 
collaboration in EU policies on cyber security, counter-
terrorism, civil protection and public health. 
The White Paper rather takes for granted that 
cooperation in foreign, security and defence policies 
will be straightforward in view of the Union’s 
intergovernmental methods of working in these fields. 
Indeed, it implies that the present unsettled security 
situation in Europe and elsewhere reinforces the 
case for a special relationship between the EU and 
the UK. The government proposes that the Political 
and Security Committee of the Council should have 
informal sessions to which British representatives 
would be invited. Such political cooperation would 
oversee arrangements for the sharing of intelligence, 
the exchange of personnel, ad hoc UK participation in 
the EU’s common security and defence missions and 
British engagement in the EU’s sanctions regime. 
The UK wants to buy into the activities of the European 
Defence Agency and looks forward to a “collaborative 
and inclusive approach” to Galileo, the European 
Defence Fund and the EU’s first steps towards 
permanent structured cooperation in defence (PESCO). 
It is hardly surprising that Mr Barnier was able to 
comment that the White Paper looked, in part, like an 
application to join the European Union. 
THE POLITICAL DECLARATION
What directly concerns Michel Barnier, of course, 
is not the White Paper (which does not need to 
be approved by the EU) but the conclusion of the 
Withdrawal Agreement and the drafting of the Political 
Declaration that will outline the framework for the 
future relationship.6 The White Paper argues, perfectly 
reasonably, that the Withdrawal Agreement and the 
Political Declaration “form a package”. It ends with an 
appeal to turn the Political Declaration into a legally 
binding treaty text as soon as possible after Brexit, 
and asks that a clause committing both sides to this 
appears in the Withdrawal Agreement itself. 
The solemn Political Declaration of the 
European Council and the UK prime 
minister will have the status of EU soft law. 
It will be binding politically on both parties.
The Political Declaration will commit the EU 
institutions and its member states to the eventual 
conclusion of the association agreement. It will also 
seek to bind a future British government to that course 
(even if led by Jeremy Corbyn). In their respective 
pieces of Brexit legislation, both the UK and the EU will 
refer to the Political Declaration as a memorandum 
7British ministers – including Jeremy Hunt, the new turn 
as Foreign Secretary – have been touring the continent 
over August pleading for the Salzburg gathering to 
show clemency. Such gran turismo will have stiffened 
the leaders against being seen to interfere directly in 
the Article 50 negotiations. Donald Tusk had wanted 
the Salzburg summit to focus on US relations. But in 
truth the leaders cannot now avoid the Brexit question. 
Nor should they. The Political Declaration is most 
definitely Chefsache, commanding the direct attention 
of the heads of state and government.
When Theresa May fleshes out her concept of a ‘third 
model’ of a new partnership, the EU leaders should 
respond constructively.8 While they will continue 
to insist on the principled indivisibility of the four 
freedoms, they should also be searching for pragmatic 
solutions, within the framework of Union law, that will 
limit the collateral damage of Brexit to the EU economy 
and salvage the international reputation of the EU. 
Unless the chiefs succeed in building a long-term 
sustainable relationship with the UK, the EU will suffer 
the consequences for many years of having a resentful, 
nationalistic and litigious neighbour on its doorstep. 
A good settlement for the British, on the other hand, 
outlined in the Political Declaration, could establish a 
precedent for new-style partnerships with all the EU’s 
neighbours. Norway, Iceland and Switzerland may well 
want to upgrade their own relations with the EU in 
emulation of the UK. 
There will be no prolongation of the 
Article 50 process.
Two strategic decisions await the summit meeting. The 
first is to emphasise that there will be no prolongation 
of the Article 50 process. If Mr Barnier continues to 
make progress towards the Withdrawal Agreement, 
an extension of his timetable will in any case be 
unnecessary. Mrs May will not ask for an extension, 
knowing full well that to do so would break her party. 
But she needs the summit to puncture the delusion 
of British Remainers who imagine that the EU 27 are 
ready to indulge in procrastination. The EU is keen to 
move on to other matters. Short of a constitutional 
crisis in Britain, the Union will not postpone Brexit.9  
It would be best to say so at Salzburg.
Secondly, the leaders should invite the Commission 
to include in the Withdrawal Agreement a provision 
permitting an extension of the transition period. Given 
the complexity of the impending negotiation of the 
association agreement, especially relating to customs 
and the Irish border, such flexibility is very much in the 
EU’s interest. If Mrs May is too shy to ask for more time 
for her ‘implementation period’, she should be force-
fed it. Brexiteers will not like it, but business and public 
administration on both sides of the Channel badly need 
a longer transition period than that presently agreed. 
If Salzburg is a success, rapid progress can be made to 
complete the Withdrawal Agreement at the October 
European Council. The main outstanding problem 
concerns the backstop for the Irish border. Negotiations 
continue. Because failure to agree benefits no one, and 
threatens everyone, there cannot not be an acceptable 
compromise on Ireland. The context will change, and 
improve, once the Political Declaration opens the way 
to the negotiation of the association agreement. 
The leaders should invite the Commission 
to include in the Withdrawal Agreement a 
provision permitting an extension of the 
transition period.
THE ‘MEANINGFUL’  VOTE
The European Parliament will insist on close scrutiny 
of the Political Declaration, knowing that it holds the 
power to seek verification from the European Court 
that the Withdrawal Agreement and the Political 
Declaration conform to the EU treaties.10 MEPs will be 
particularly watchful of the way in which the Political 
Declaration tackles governance issues, the long-term 
treatment of the Irish border, and the permanent status 
of EU citizens in Britain. 
Scrutiny by the Westminster Parliament is no less 
important – but far more difficult. To date, British 
parliamentarians have focused on procedural matters 
to the detriment of substance. It is clear that Mrs May’s 
misjudged general election in 2017 has not succeeded 
in exorcising the ghost of the 2016 referendum: most 
MPs, whatever their better judgement about Brexit, are 
still confounded by the result of the popular vote which 
they were (almost all) complicit in promoting.11
Nevertheless, in due course the prime minister has 
to table the Withdrawal Agreement plus the Political 
Declaration for a ‘meaningful vote’ at Westminster. 
Pundits claim that there is no majority in the Commons 
for anything. That, of course, is nonsense. Every 
parliamentary vote produces a result. Under Britain’s 
wondrous constitution, a simple majority of one can be 
full of meaning. So what will happen? 
A small minority of militants on both sides of the 
argument will want to oppose the package. But 
an unholy alliance between die-hard Leavers and 
Remainers will not look credible and will hardly  
gather public support. None of the opposition parties 
have been able to come up with a viable alternative  
to a deal based on Chequers that would be acceptable 
to the EU. Remain MPs do not agree about how bad 
a bad deal would have to be in order to overturn the 
referendum result. 
8legislation (Statutory Instruments) that the 
government must table to execute secession and 
then fill the legislative vacuum. The Brexit process is 
destined to continue, possibly indefinitely. 
THE ‘PEOPLE’S VOTE’
Some Remainers, wanting to continue the abdication of 
Parliament, are campaigning for a second referendum. 
Most of these people actively promoted the ‘In/
Out’ referendum in 2016, and pledged to respect its 
outcome. Their excuse for changing direction is that a 
‘people’s vote’ on the facts of the final deal is necessary 
to redress the distortions of the first campaign and to 
settle Britain’s European question for good (a claim 
also made, of course, before the first referendum). 
Notwithstanding the problem that the Withdrawal 
Agreement and Political Declaration are not in truth 
the final deal (which will only emerge in a few years’ 
time), a panicky referendum in present circumstances 
promises to be catastrophic. Opinion polls suggest that 
a majority is forming against a hard Brexit, but that a 
rerun of a referendum on ‘Leave’ versus ‘Remain’ would 
be just as close as the first: certainly the assumption 
that Remain would win handsomely is an arrogant one 
not supported by the facts. 
The argument on the streets, in fact, would 
be about nationalism, xenophobia and 
democratic betrayal.
Advocates of a ‘people’s vote’ have yet to explain 
what question they wish to put to a referendum. 
Some want it to decide between the Withdrawal 
Agreement and no deal. Others want a referendum 
to choose between no deal and the status quo. Yet 
others want multiple choice questions. All are 
deceptive. The first option is not acceptable to 
Parliament; the second is no longer acceptable to the 
EU; the third is a joke. In effect, referendum voters 
would be put in an invidious position. 
The campaign would not turn on the quality of Mr 
Barnier’s treaty. The argument on the streets, in 
fact, would be about nationalism, xenophobia and 
democratic betrayal. The pound would tank. The 
fragile UK constitution would be put under further 
immense strain, with the certainty that parliament at 
Westminster would again emerge emasculated and its 
discredited political parties split asunder.  The nation 
would end up even more divided in terms of social 
class, generation and province, potentially pitching 
into a revolutionary situation. 
Instead of toying with populism, it would be better 
for politicians of all persuasions to shoulder their 
responsibility for the national interest. Parliament 
should not veto the Barnier deal. 
None of the opposition parties have been 
able to come up with a viable alternative 
to a deal based on Chequers that would 
be acceptable to the EU. Remain MPs 
do not agree about how bad a bad deal 
would have to be in order to overturn the 
referendum result.
To date, the debate at Westminster has been curiously 
disconnected from the reality of the EU talks. Once 
an Article 50 deal is tabled for scrutiny, however, it 
should become clear that this is the EU’s final offer. 
Having laboured hard to deliver two versions of a 
new settlement for Britain, the rest of the EU is in 
no mood and in no fit state to devise a third. In 2016 
the EU offered David Cameron a deal on continued 
membership which was rejected in the referendum. 
If Parliament refuses the EU’s 2019 offer of an 
association agreement, there will be no going back to 
the drawing board: Europe has run out of tolerance 
with the British. 
If no deal is reached in the Article 50 talks, or if the 
deal reached is subsequently rejected by the British 
Parliament, the EU’s contingency plans will be put 
into operation and it will extricate itself from the UK 
as best it can on 29 March. Soon afterwards, in any 
event, normal business will be suspended in Brussels 
until the new Parliament and Commission is elected 
and Mr Tusk’s successor takes his place in December. 
Having laboured hard to deliver two 
versions of a new settlement for Britain, 
the rest of the EU is in no mood and in no 
fit state to devise a third.
However, if the withdrawal package is agreed as 
planned in the autumn, MPs and peers will face 
another complicated piece of primary legislation in 
an EU (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill. This measure 
will cope with the transition period (in UK parlance, 
the ‘implementation’ period) during which the UK, 
to all intents and purposes, will remain subject 
to EU law. The proposed bill will put back on the 
statute book much of the content of the European 
Communities Act 1972 which the EU (Withdrawal) 
Act 2018 has just removed. Another White Paper, 
published on 24 July, does its best to explain.12 To 
date, Westminster seems ill-prepared to undertake 
serious scrutiny of the 600 or so pieces of separate 
subsidiary laws seen as indispensable to accomplish 
the Brexit process let alone the blizzard of tertiary 
9Once Brexit is done, Mr Barnier’s Task Force 50 will be 
disbanded and serious negotiations for the association 
agreement will commence under new EU management. 
A general election in Britain no later than May 2022 
will determine Britain’s future as a European country. 
The options will include continuing to develop the 
association agreement or to apply again to join the 
European Union as a full member state.14
Instead of toying with populism, it would 
be better for politicians of all persuasions 
to shoulder their responsibility for the 
national interest. Parliament should not 
veto the Barnier deal.
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